

**\*This written report is in addition to requirements to verbally report certain types of incidents. Verbal reports may be made by calling AQMD at 1-800-288-7664 (1-800-CUT-SMOG) or AQMD enforcement personnel.**

**Section I – Facility Information**

1. Facility Name: ConocoPhillips Los Angeles Refinery, Wilmington Facility ID (6-Digit): 800363

2. Address (where incident occurred): 1660 West Anaheim St.  
 City Wilmington State CA Zip Code 90744

3. Mailing Address (if different from Item 2): P.O. Box 758  
 City Wilmington State CA Zip Code 90748

4. Provide the name, title, and phone number of the person to contact for further information:  
Steve Mallon Name Sr. Consulting Engineer Title (310) 952-6141 Phone

**Section II – Reporting of Breakdowns, Deviations, and Emergencies**

1. This written notification is to report a(n):

Type of Incident	Verbal Report Due*	Written Report Due
a. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Breakdown under: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Rule 430 (Non-RECLAIM) <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 2004 (RECLAIM)  <input type="checkbox"/> Rule 218 (Non-RECLAIM) [Sec Rule 218 (f)(3)]	For Rules 430 & 2004 - Within 1 hour of discovery.  For Rule 218 - Within 24 hours or next business day for failure/shutdown exceeding 24 hours	For Rules 430 & 2004 - Within 7 calendar days after breakdown is corrected, but no later than 30 days from start of the breakdown, unless a written extension is granted.  For Rule 218 - With required semi-annual reports.
b. <input type="checkbox"/> Deviation with excess emissions [Sec Title V Permit, Section K, Condition No. 22B]	Within 72 hours of discovery of the deviation or shorter reporting period if required by an applicable State or Federal Regulation.	Within 14 days of discovery of the deviation.
c. <input type="checkbox"/> Other Deviation [Sec Title V Permit, Section K, Condition Nos. 22D & 23]	None	With required semi-annual monitoring reports.
d. <input type="checkbox"/> Emergency under Rule 3002 (g)	Within 1 hour of discovery.	Within 2 working days from when the emission limit was exceeded.

2. The incident was first **discovered** by: ConocoPhillips Operations on? 10/23/03 5:25 AM  
 Name Date X PM

3. The incident was first **reported** to: 800 CUT SMOG, Oper. 2 on? 10/23/03 6:12 AM  
 Name of AQMD Staffperson Date X PM

a.  Via Phone      b.  Via Voice Mail  
 c.  Via Fax      d.  Via Mail  
 e.  Via Email      f.  In Person

Notification Number: 60701

4. When did the incident actually occur? 10/23/03 5:20  AM  PM  
 Date

5. Has the incident stopped? a.  Yes, on: 10/23/03 9:15  AM  PM  
 (See response to #16 below) Date

6. What was the total duration of the incident? 0

7. For equipment with an operating cycle, as defined in Rule 430 (b)(3)(A),  
 When was the end of the operating cycle during which the incident occurred? \_\_\_\_\_  AM  
 Date Time  PM

8. Describe the incident and identify each piece of equipment (by permit, application, or device number) affected. Attach photos (when available) of the affected equipment and attach additional pages as necessary.

Observed visible emissions from North Flare (C706), South Flare (C723), Boiler 7 (D686) and No. 2 SRU Incinerator (C456).

9. The incident may have resulted in a:

- a.  Violation of Permit Condition(s): Rule 203(b)  
b.  Violation of AQMD Rule(s): Rule 401 and potentially Rules 404 & 405, as applicable

10. What was the probable cause of the incident? Attach additional pages as necessary.

There was an upset of the steam system caused by a malfunctioning analog input point, PIC126, that caused the auxiliary steam header valve, PV-126A, to close. The closing of PV-126A caused the auxiliary steam header to overpressure which lifted the relief valves on the Boiler 8 and Cogen steam drums. The closing of PV-126A also caused a loss of steam flow and pressure to the main steam header. During the steam system upset boilers 4 and 7 shutdown. The loss of steam to the main header caused an upset to the FCCU Wet Gas compressor and the suction line relief valves opened causing flaring to the North Flare. The lack of gas from the Wet Gas Compressor upset the fuel gas system. Shortly after the flaring began the Cogen unit shutdown on reverse power because of the upset to the fuel gas system. The Cogen's shutdown reduced the quantity of steam available to continue to operate the flares in a smokeless manner resulting in opacity from the flares exceeding 20%.

11. Did the incident result in excess emissions? A.  No B.  Yes (Complete the following and attach calculations.)
- |                              |           |   |                |  |                   |                              |           |
|------------------------------|-----------|---|----------------|--|-------------------|------------------------------|-----------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> VOC | _____ lbs | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NOx | <u>274 Lbs</u> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sox    | <u>6940 Lbs</u>   | <input type="checkbox"/> H2S | _____ lbs |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CO  | _____ lbs | <input type="checkbox"/> PM             | _____ Lbs      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other: | <u>20% &lt; X</u> | Opacity                      | _____     |

12. For RECLAIM facilities Subject to Rule 2004 (I)(3) ONLY: If excess emissions of NOx and/or SOx were reported in Item 11, do you want these emissions to be counted when determining compliance with your annual allocations?

- a.  Yes, for:  NOx  SOx  
b.  No, for:  NOx  SOx

If box 12(b) above is checked, include all information specified in Rule 2004(i)(3)(B) and (C), as applicable.

13. Describe the steps taken to correct the problem (i.e., steps taken to mitigate excess emissions, equipment repairs, etc.) And the preventative measures employed to avoid future incidents. Include photos of the failed equipment if available. And attach additional pages as necessary.

Mitigations: All operating refinery units were either shutdown or operated at reduced rates to reduce refinery steam demand. All H2S produced was routed to the acid plant as feedstock since unit 138 Sulfur recovery unit was placed in hot standby. Lastly, the sour water stripper was shutdown.

**Corrective Action:**

All steam consuming operations were curtailed to the maximum extent practical and operating boilers Nos. 4, 7 (after re-starting) and 8 were used to stabilize the steam headers. As the steam pressure increased the cogen's fuel gas compressor was started up, the cogeneration unit returned to operation and increased steam production and the potential violations were corrected.

Preventative Measures: LAR is still investigating the incident and has not yet identified any preventative measures.

14. Was the facility operating properly prior to the incident?

- a.  Yes b.  No, because: \_\_\_\_\_

15. Did the incident result from operator error, neglect or improper operation or maintenance procedures?

- a.  No b.  Yes, because: \_\_\_\_\_

16. Has the facility returned to compliance?

- a.  No, because: \_\_\_\_\_

- b.  Yes (Attach evidence such as emissions calculations, contemporaneous operating logs or other credible evidence.)

Visible emissions from refinery north flare ceased at 9:15 PM.